Critique of Software Security by Cox, G. et al.
CRITIQUE OF SOFTWARE SECURITY
Geoff Cox & Martin Knahl
27
Screenshot: Jonah Brucker-Cohen, Michael Bennett, 




CRITIQUE OF SOFTWARE SECURITY
An exception to this is the right to strike, conceded by the State in recognition 
of the inevitability of antagonism in human societies. Yet to strike is an active 
refusal to work, the withdrawal of actions, a non-action, and is not necessarily 
violent. Where violence is more easily discernible is that the motivation to strike 
in the ﬁrst place is to escape from the violence imposed on the worker by the 
employer. This position is in keeping with Trotsky, in his essay ‘Terrorism’ of 
1911, who considers arguments against the use of violence to be a hypocrisy in 
that the entire state apparatus and its laws, police, and army are nothing but an 
apparatus for capitalist terror: 
‘Our class enemies are in the habit of complaining about our terrorism. What 
they mean by this is rather unclear. They would like to label all the activities 
of the proletariat directed against the class enemy’s interests as terrorism. The 
strike, in their eyes, is the principal method of terrorism. The threat of a strike, 
the organisation of strike pickets, an economic boycott of a slave driving boss, 
a moral boycott of a traitor from our ranks - all this and much more they call 
terrorism. If terrorism is understood in this way as any action inspiring fear in, 
or doing harm to, the enemy - then of course the entire class struggle is nothing 
but terrorism.’ (1987) 
The right to strike translates as the right to use a form of violence to attain certain 
ends, and the State reserves the right to counter this with violence.3 Trotsky 
points to the glaring paradox of a value system that argues for the ‘absolute value 
of human life’ and at the same time sacriﬁces millions of people in wars. On the 
one hand violence is seen to be inadmissible, and yet on the other, in exceptional 
circumstances it is seen to be necessary – in a ‘shift from the moral high ground 
to raw self-interest’ (Buck-Morss 2003: 33).4 
Much the same paradox applies in the contemporary ‘war on terror’, as the state 
of emergency becomes the justiﬁcation for the erosion of citizen’s rights and 
freedoms that were hard won. The duplicity is evident in the way those deemed 
a danger to national security can be taken into custody and detained in ways 
Security is predicated on protection from perceived violence or terrorism, 
but who will protect us from security? Behind this statement is the fact that 
those in power regularly commit acts of real and symbolic violence and this 
goes unpunished – indeed it is legitimated so effectively that we think we are 
protected by these acts of violence against us in the form of security. This essay 
asks how the inherent violence encoded into software might be understood in 
this way. The arguement is that – rather than simply assuming that it protects 
the user from insecurity - security software itself constitutes violence. These are 
some of the conditions that produce states of emergency and that in turn create 
insecurities.
Critique of Violence 
The background to this line of thinking draws upon Walter Benjamin’s 1921 
essay ‘Critique of Violence’.1 For Benjamin, the issue is not whether violence is a 
means to a just or unjust end (a critique of ‘just ends’) but whether violence can 
be a moral means in itself. As he puts it, ‘a more exact criterion is needed, which 
would discriminate within the sphere of means themselves, without regard for 
the ends they serve’ (1996: 236).2 Rather than simply reconciling just ends by a 
justiﬁcation of the means, or vice versa, the ‘Critique of Violence’ essay focuses 
on the realm of means, or more precisely: ‘the question of the justiﬁcation of 
certain means that constitute violence’ as Benjamin puts it (1996: 237). 
As far as the State is concerned, violence exercised by individuals, or its legal 
subjects, is a threat to the legal system that serves to justify its own use of violence. 
Legal ends appear to be only achievable by legal power. The law uses violence for 
legal ends that the law itself has decided. For instance, and as an agent of State 
authority, police violence is legitimated as both law-making and law-preserving 
– and indeed all violence is a means of law-making and law-preserving according 
to Benjamin. This indicates the law’s ‘monopoly on violence’ as he puts it, in not 
simply preserving legal ends but more importantly in preserving the law itself. It 
also afﬁrms the threat of actions that are outside of the law, to the law itself, and 
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that erase individual human rights, turning them into a ‘noncitizen’ such that 
‘bare life reaches its maximum indeterminacy’ (Agamben 2005: 4). The way the 
State suspends and withdraws its guarantee of protection and legal entitlement 
is a condition of contemporary power, and this is discussed in depth in Giorgio 
Agamben’s State of Exception (2005). Extending Carl Schmitt’s Politische 
Theologie of 1922 that established the contiguity between sovereignty and 
the state of exception, Agamben argues that the state of exception, although 
described as a provisional measure in exceptional circumstances, has become 
the working paradigm of modern government.5 Under this logic, State power 
uses violence against an identiﬁable enemy so that its use of power appears 
legitimate despite the active contradiction with its own legal and natural laws. 
When the required ends cannot be guaranteed by the legal system alone, the 
repressive state apparatus further intervenes ‘for security reasons’ (Benjamin 
1996: 243). Security marks the exception, in other words. 
Software Violence 
Software running over networks is a manifestation of ideology, and connectivity 
remains a security threat beyond its purely technical functionality. This is what 
Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, in The Exploit, describe as the new 
‘network-network symmetry’ of power, in which control is distributed relatively 
autonomously in horizontal organisational locales and at the same time into 
rigid vertical hierarchies or directed commands (2007). This description is a 
socio-technical truism of course, and one that supports their claim that networks 
and sovereignty are not incompatible. Indeed together they are exceptional 
and are always related as ‘sovereignty-in-networks’. Correspondingly, the 
recommendation to those developing oppositional tactics is to take advantage 
of the vulnerabilities in networks by exploiting power differentials that exist in 
the system. This is precisely what software developers and malware (malicious 
software) authors have discovered, as they exploit vulnerable operating systems, 
internet service and security software. 
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future vulnerabilities (Igure & Williams 2008).8 Malware is usually installed 
via worms, trojan horses or backdoors under a common command and control 
infrastructure. A program installed by a botnet can violate a system’s hard 
disc and monitor its user’s keystrokes to gather private data (such as sensitive 
ﬁnancial information, including credit card numbers and passwords for bank or 
Paypal accounts) and then distribute the retrieved data over the internet to its 
‘master’. For example, the function names and keywords below are taken from 
a popular bot with packet snifﬁng capabilities to capture online credentials and 
other information (from Ianelli & Hackworth 2005):  
bool IsSuspiciousBot(const char *szBuf) – looks for keywords related to 














bool IsSuspiciousIRC(const char *szBuf) – looks for keywords related to 




• “You are now an IRC Operator”
bool IsSuspiciousFTP(const char *szBuf) – looks for FTP authentication 
credentials triggered by keywords such as USER and PASS.
bool IsSuspiciousHTTP(const char *szBuf) – may attempt to gather HTTP 
based authentication credentials and other valuable data. In this sample 






bool IsSuspiciousVULN(const char *szBuf) – looks for keywords that 
indicate vulnerable server versions. Examples include:
• “OpenSSL/0.9.6”
• “Serv-U FTP Server”
• “OpenSSH_2”
images: Symantec <http://www.symantec.com/>
as the use of viruses, spam, click fraud, phishing, and ‘botnets’ (collections of 
software robots, or bots, that run autonomously).6 A vast amount of terms such 
as these has evolved in the area of software security,7 and more or less structured 
collections exist either in the form of security-industry recommendations 
(see Symantec images) or as standards for research. An understanding of the 
characteristics and nature of known vulnerabilities has also been organised into 
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Eventually Blue Security surrendered and went out of business, expressing their 
reluctance (unlike the Israeli State) to take part in an ever-escalating ‘soft war’ 
of violence and counter-violence. The point is that security software operates 
double standards.
It would seem that the issue of security is reducible to the challenge of managing 
the inherent insecurities of networked relations. In other words, the network 
needs to distinguish whether you are a friend or not, evoking Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of enmity (in The Concept of the Political, of 1927).11 Under contemporary 
neo-liberal conditions – inextricably linked to security – it is clear that liberal 
democracies exert a form of violence through their insistence on friendliness 
and participation in networks. This is the organised violence of democracy or 
‘violence of participation’, as Markus Meissen puts it (2007: 26).12 In other 
words, liberal democracy exerts a form of friendly violence that doesn’t appear 
violent at all – such as encouraging the use of certain kinds of software. All the 
time the violence is exerted nonviolently under the guise of protection from 
violence: security. 
Software Nonviolence
When no other choice is possible, software violence might be the answer – 
replacing the strike in the form of software that Deleuze anticipated when he 
claimed: ‘Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and 
what the nineteenth century called “sabotage” (“clogging” the machinery).’ 
(1990) There are many examples of artists and activists working in this way 
through direct action and hacking. Hackers, crackers,13 or system intruders are 
generally understood as those who attempt to penetrate security systems on 
remote computers, but this is a pejorative use of the term. In general it simply 
refers to a person who was capable of creating hacks, or demonstrating technical 
virtuosity (Levy 1984). The ethical principles of hacking reﬂect these concerns:
‘* Access to computers – and anything that might teach you something about the 
way the world really works – should be unlimited and total. 
There are countless other cases that illustrate insecurity issues surrounding 
botnets and the ways in which vulnerability in the system is exploited. With 
the popularity of ﬁlesharing and the high volumes of computers connected to 
peer to peer (P2P) networks, they have also become increasingly open to attack. 
The Trojan.Peacomm is an example of a trojan horse that provides the basis for 
building a P2P botnet (Grizzard 2007). The threat typically arrives in an email 
with a subject (e.g. ‘U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has kicked German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’), and attachments (e.g. ‘Full Story.exe’) and an empty 
body. The executable is a trojan horse which modiﬁes a system’s services .exe 
process and adds hidden threads. The ‘infected’ system subsequently attempts to 
establish P2P communication via UDP using a set of given IP addresses to obtain 
additional malicious ﬁles. Using a ﬁrewall with egress ﬁltering, it can be detected 
that the services.exe process attempts to connect to a remote address via a UDP 
port. Subsequently the system will receive additional IP addresses, in essence 
building up a distributed network. To facilitate the process, the trojan further 
maintains a list of unsuitable peers. The strategy of using P2P communication 
spreads the load and further improves the robustness of the botnet, particularly 
when compared to the traditional approach of using centralised command and 
control servers.9
Botnets can also cause severe disruption on targeted sites. A botnet can control 
a set of ‘hijacked’ systems to target systems (e.g. a commercial or government 
website) with information requests in a distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack. In the extreme, a system that is unable to handle excessive crashes, 
sometimes brings down an entire data centre with it. In May 2006, the American 
blog-publishing ﬁrm Six Apart found itself the victim of a DDoS assault by 
an especially aggressive botnet. Within minutes, the company’s servers had 
crashed, causing the blogs of 10 million customers to disappear. Six Apart 
eventually discovered that the attack was not aimed at itself but rather at one of 
its customers, an Israeli ﬁrm named Blue Security, which had caused ignominy 
by offering a spam-counter attack service (Berinato 2006).10 However the 
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process requests for web pages that do not exist. FloodNet’s Java applet asks the 
targeted server for a directory called, in this example, “human_rights”, but since 
that directory doesn’t exist, the server returns the familiar “File not Found” or 
“Error 404” message, recording the bad request. This is a unique way to leave a 
message on that server.’ (Stalbaum)18 
The tactic follows the hacker sensibility in opening up existing security 
vulnerabilities in the system. As ever, power continues to produce its own 
vulnerability but the question of violence is more unsettling and paradoxical. 
For some hackers, the ethical practices of free software represent a move away 
from the use of violence.19 However what this essay has tried to establish is how 
violence is simply unavoidable and is inherent to the socio-technical structures 
of networks. In addition, insecurity is promoted by a burgeoning security 
industry that creates both awareness and fear regarding perceived insecurity,20 
intensifying the dependency of users on its software and at the same time 
engendering a growing ambivalence even amongst security professionals who 
recognise that ‘security causes its own type of harm’.21 
The actions of software dissidents can be seen to extend network forms of 
antagonism and the justiﬁcation of certain means that constitute violence – 
further evoking Benjamin’s essay. Moreover, software is necessarily violent even 
when it appears nonviolent.
Pure Software Violence  
In addition to ‘systemic violence’, there is symbolic violence embodied in 
language itself - not simply as an incitement to a violent action or in the ways that 
language reﬂects social domination (e.g. ‘man-made’ language) or heavy critique 
in general – but in the way that it produces meaning more fundamentally. For 
instance, in saying that ‘a fundamental violence exists in this “essencing” ability 
of language’ (2008: 58), Slavoj  ˇZizˇek is making reference to Hegel’s observation 
that there is something inherently violent in the capacity of language to represent 
a thing – an act equivalent to its symbolic death. In the realm of software, 
Always yield to the Hands-On Imperative!
* All information should be free.
* Mistrust authority – promote decentralization.
* Hackers should be judged by their acting, not bogus criteria such as degrees, 
age, race, or position.
* You can create art and beauty on a computer.
* Computers can change your life for the better.
* Don’t litter other people’s data.
* Make public data available, protect private data.’14
In keeping with these principles, it should be stated that most hackers condemn 
attacks against communication systems. In 1999, the Chaos Computer Club 
joined an international coalition of hacker groups (including the Cult of the Dead 
Cow)15 to condemn the use of networks as battlegrounds in their declaration for 
‘info peace’: ‘DO NOT support any acts of “Cyberwar”. Keep the networks of 
communication alive. They are the nervous system for human progress.’16
An excellent example of non-violent direct action is the FloodNet tactical 
software developed in 1998 by the Electronic Disturbance Theater.17 The 
FloodNet implementation is based on Java applets that assists in the execution of 
virtual sit-ins or online civil acts of disobedience, and offered as a tool to enable 
protestors to effectively shut down web servers of target institutions, by ﬂooding 
them with requests. The requests are automatically reloaded at high frequencies 
to cause an excessive amount of trafﬁc on the server so that other users are 
not able to access the website. It further enables users to post statements to a 
targeted site by transmitting them to the server’s log ﬁles:
‘By the selection of  phases for use in building the “bad” urls , for example using 
“human_rights” to form the url “http://www.xxx.gb.mx/human_rights”, the 
FloodNet is able to upload messages to server error logs by intentionally asking 
for a non-existent url. This causes the server to return messages like “human_
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programming languages are even more overtly violent – not simply representing 
a thing but enacting it. In other words, if source code says something and does 
something at the same time, it symbolises and enacts violence on the thing. It 
literally executes it.
In writing these words on a computer, violence and counter-violence is 
demonstrated in the choice of software and operating systems. Software 
development is limited through force. Violence is exerted against information 
that wants to be free. In what Angela Mitropoulos refers to as the ‘softwar’ (2007) 
proprietary software commits violence against users, all the time forcing users to 
pay and upgrade regularly when there are viable free alternatives. Mitropoulos 
is more speciﬁcally referring to the issue of intellectual property and related 
conﬂicts over sharing digital content, such as those over P2P ﬁle sharing. The 
perpetrator in this case breaks a number of basic principles inherent to digital 
media processes where ﬁles can be freely copied and shared, and furthermore 
legislates to normalise this contrary way of working. The moral ambiguities 
of software licenses and duplicities of the law are clear, and at the heart of all 
contractual agreements. To break a contract is to activate the threat of violence 
enforced by the law, whereas the greater violence has already been committed 
and gone unpunished. This is the basis for the piracy ethic, in stealing back what 
was already stolen in the ﬁrst place.
On the relation between violence and social transformation, Benjamin refers to 
Georges Sorel’s essay ‘Reﬂections on Violence’ (1915) to expose the distinction 
between violence and force (1996: 245-6).22 Sorel points to the failure of 
parliamentary democracy to deliver its promises and to the principle of counter-
violence, not only through strikes but through revolution. The point is that under 
certain conditions violence becomes force, as ‘pure means’.23 The consequences 
of the disruption of means and ends are political, as Agamben conﬁrms: ‘Politics 
is the sphere neither of an end in itself nor of means subordinated to an end; 
rather, it is the sphere of a pure mediality without end intended as the ﬁeld of 
human action and of human thought.’ (2000: 116)
In Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, the concept of pure means invokes the 
potential for ‘pure immediate violence’ – human action that neither makes nor 
preserves law, but is outside of the law. The idea of ‘pure violence’ does not 
apply to any violent action in itself, but in its relation to external conditions. 
The present is seized from the impure violence of history in what Benjamin 
describes as the ‘real state of emergency’ (Wohlfarth 2009: 14).24 The paradox 
of Benjamin’s position is in drawing together proletarian violence (informed by 
Marxism) with the theology of divine violence represented by Judaic Messianism 
- where redemption is provided by ‘pure divine violence’. So rather than promote 
terrorist violence, or as necessary means justiﬁed by ends, he calls for: ‘collective 
political action that is lethal not to human beings, but to the humanly created 
mythic powers that reign over them’ (Buck-Morss 2003: 33). The concept of 
pure, divine violence is a violence that appears to come from nowhere – from 
beyond the law – in which ‘killing is neither a crime nor a sacriﬁce’ according to 
Zˇizˇek, because law applies only to the living.  ˇZizˇek continues: ‘Divine violence is 
an expression of pure drive, of the undeadness, the excess of life, which strikes 
the “bare life” regulated by law.’ (2008: 168). For Benjamin, revolution requires 
this sense of excess; or in Agamben’s words, it is a means without end. 
With software, pure means opens up vulnerabilities in the system as a practice of 
creating insecurity. If no one will protect us from the violence of security, there is 
no option but to release ‘pure softwar’ – as resistance to the mythic powers that 
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NOTES: 
1. In addition to Benjamin, it should be said that the question of violence is addressed by many 
others, such as those mentioned in the text, but also: Hannah Arendt’s ‘On Violence’ (1969), 
Pierre Clastres’s ‘Archaeology of  Violence’ (1979), and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth 
(published in French as Les damnés de la terre, 1961) in which violence opposes the violence of 
colonialism. In attempting to actualise the ‘Critique of Violence’, the excesses of the Red Army 
Faction operating in Germany during the 1970s are often cited. Irving Wohlfarth’s ‘Critique of 
Violence’ (2009) charts the connections/disconnections between Benjamin’s ‘Critique’ and the 
RAF’s violent interpretation. 
2. This is important to Benjamin’s argument as otherwise violence operates as if by ‘natural 
law’, in a Darwinian fashion as ‘the only original means, besides natural selection, appropriate 
to all the vital ends of nature’ (1996: 237). In contrast to natural law that takes violence to be 
a product of nature, ‘positive law’ takes violence as a product of history. The problem is that 
‘positive law is blind to the absoluteness of ends, natural law is equally so to the contingency of 
means’ (1996: 237). Whereas natural law seeks to justify means, positive law tries to guarantee 
ends. 
3. What is distinguished in Trotsky’s formulation is not individual terrorist acts, but collective 
acts against the system. He says: ‘In our eyes, individual terror is inadmissible precisely 
because it belittles the role of the masses in their own consciousness, reconciles them to their 
powerlessness...’ (1987). Moreover, Capitalist society allows strikes on the basis that it requires 
an active, mobile, cognitive, communicative and socialised labour force, but it is the self-
recognition of this, that is necessary in Trotsky’s view to consolidate self-organisation that leads 
to the strategic ‘alignment of class forces, the proletariat’s social weight’.
4. Susan Buck-Morss points to the ﬂagrant opportunism of the US in this respect, and the 
West in general, in how it approaches ‘democracy’ with double standards. She quotes Samuel 
Huntington: ‘Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalism to power; 
nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel... human rights are an issue with 
China but not with Saudi Arabia’ (2003: 32). The present terrorism of Israeli actions in Gaza 
conﬁrms the point all too clearly (January 2009). Furthermore, IAA’s Terminal Air project (herein) 
is another example of double standards or what they call ‘implausible deniability’.  
5. That security is the leading principle of state politics is also emphasised in Agamben’s ‘On 
Security and Terror’ (herein), such that the State ‘can always be provoked by terrorism to become 
itself terrorist’ (2001).
6. The term botnet refers to a network of computers using distributed computing software but 
is typically associated with compromised computers (sometimes also referred to as Zombie 
computers) running malicious software. For more on botnets, and links to other technical 
terminology, see the wikipedia entry <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botnet>.
Some computer security experts believe that at least 10% of home PCs have been recruited into 
botnets (Carr 2007). The majority of these computers are running Microsoft Windows operating 
systems, but other operating systems can be affected. 
7. Examples include: ‘the most trusted source for computer security training, certiﬁcation and 
research’ <http://www.sans.org/resources/glossary.php>, ‘... 10 biggest network threats’ <http://
www.itsecurity.com/features/networksecurity-threats-011707/>, Internet Engineering Task Force 
IETF RFC4949 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt> and RFC2828 that provide extensive 
Internet Security Glossaries (e.g. RFC4949 totals 365 pages).
8. Vinay M. Igure and Ronald D. Williams (2008) suggest the following properties for an efﬁcient 
taxonomy of attacks and vulnerabilities in Computer Systems: Application — or system-speciﬁc 
taxonomy; Taxonomy must be layered or hierarchical; First level of classiﬁcation — attack 
impact; Second level of classiﬁcation — system-speciﬁc attack; Third level of classiﬁcation 
— system components (attack targets); Fourth level of classiﬁcation — system features (source 
of vulnerability); Classes need not be mutually exclusive.
9. A useful project in relation to this rise in the abuse of P2P networks is ‘Six/Four’, ‘a ﬂexible 
framework consisting of a formally speciﬁed P2P protocol. This protocol is best described as a 
trust-enhanced anonymous tunneling protocol, and meant to provide people with anonymous, 
secure access to public data.’ <http://www.hacktivismo.com/projects/index.php> Download from 
<http://sourceforge.net/projects/sixfour/>.
10. Blue Security’s URL <http://bluesecurity.com/> is now a dead link. For a description of the 
anti-spanning tool and subsequent backlash, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Frog>.
11. Schmitt’s critique of liberalism lies in its inability to recognise antagonism as inevitable in 
human societies, and the political differentiation of friend or enemy lies at the centre of this. 
But, as liberal democracies are seen to be inadequate, the consequence of this for Schmitt is a 
legitimation of authoritarian regimes. 
12. Social networking platforms arguably demonstrate the ‘violence of participation’. For more on 
this, see Antisocial Applications <http://project.arnolﬁni.org.uk/projects/2008/antisocial/notes.
php>.
13. To clarify the distinction: a hacker is thus someone with proﬁciency and practical 
understanding of the structure and operations of computer networks and systems. Those with 
more malign intentions are sometimes known as crackers (aka terrorists).  
14. From ‘Hacker Ethics’ <http://www.ccc.de/hackerethics?language=en>. Also see Steven 
Mizrach’s ‘Is there a Hacker Ethic for 90s Hackers?’, http://www.ﬁu.edu/~mizrachs/hackethic.
html
15. The Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc) is an extremely inﬂuential hackers group, established in 
1984, and opposing anyone or any government that aspires to limit free speech <http://www.
cultdeadcow.com>. For instance, its global campaign against Google was launched in 2006, and 
Goolag Scanner was released in 2008 <http://www.goolag.org/>.
16. The 1999 declaration of ‘info peace’ <http://www.ccc.de/CRD/CRD19990107.html> 
(although this a broken link on the CCC web site). In the wake of 9/11, a Chaos Computer 
Club press release (of 09/13/2001) further emphasised the point that more international 
understanding was required not conﬂict <http://www.ccc.de/press/releases/2001/CCC20010913.
en.html>.
17. The Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) is a small group of cyber activists and artists 
engaged in developing the theory and practice of Electronic Civil Disobedience (ECD). The group 
initially executed FloodNet in April and December 1998 on Mexican and American government 
sites respectively. The ECD web site <http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html> contains a log 
of current and past actions. FloodNet can also be downloaded from the site <http://www.thing.
net/~rdom/ecd/ﬂoodnet.html>. 
18. The quote continues: ‘Past versions of the FloodNet have tuned this idea to current 
events, such as during the June 10 protest when the names of the Zapatista farmers killed 
by the Mexican Army in military attacks on the autonomous village of El Bosque, were used 
in the construction of the “bad” urls. In an artistic sense, this is a way of remembering and 
honoring those who gave their lives in defense of their freedom. In a conceptual sense, the 
FloodNet performance was able to facilitate a symbolic return of the dead to the servers of those 
responsible for their murders.’ (op cit.)
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wikipedia entry that includes a section on the use of tactical media <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Zapatista_Army_of_National_Liberation>.
19. Thanks to Jaromil for clariﬁcation of this point (from an email exchange in December 2008), 
and for pointing to the ‘info-peace’ declaration (see note 16). 
20. According to different market surveys the size of the security software market is experiencing 
rapid growth, fuelled by ‘compliance, data leakage and privacy issues, along with the need to 
tackle the fast evolving and sophisticated threat environment’ (Thomson 2008). According to 
latest ﬁgures from Gartner, sales of enterprise security products rose by nearly 20 per cent in 
2007 and were worth $10.4bn. Symantec dominates the enterprise security market with over 26 
per cent market share, followed by McAfee with over 11 per cent (Thomson 2008).
21. Gerald V Post and Albert Kagan raise the question whether IT controls are a burden or 
beneﬁt. According to the results of their study: ‘34% of the respondents perceived interference 
or delays caused by the security systems as a consequence of their business environment... 
general employees perceive that increases (more onerous measures) in security policies and 
practices result in greater interference(s) with their job responsibilities’. Post and Kagan further 
suggest that users should be part of creating a security policy and suggest the testing of security 
restrictions on users to minimise task interference.
22. Note the German word ‘Gewalt’ means both violence and force. 
23. The use of the phrase ‘pure means’ is interesting in this connection as it evokes interlinking 
ideas expressed in Hannah Arendt’s essay ‘Labor, Work, Action’ (2000) and Giorgio Agamben’s 
short collection of essays Means Without End (2000); both making reference to Aristotle’s claim 
that action is an end in itself. 
24. An extensive discussion of Benjamin’s essay and its reception in relation to a rejection of 
the law for ‘messianic anarchy’ appears in Wohlfarth’s ‘Critique of Violence’ (2009). Wohlfarth 
maintains that the emphasis of politics over history is crucial to a reading of Benjamin’s 
‘Critique’, in ‘seizing the present’; what Benjamin describes elsewhere as exploding the historical 
continuum. 
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